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Introduction 
 
In the recent years, the EU policy discourse has endorsed the notion of “science diplomacy” that 
points to the interaction between scientific research and foreign policy as instrumental in the societal 
and political progress. Commissioner for science, research and innovation Carlos Moedas is 
particularly keen on seeing “the EU play an increasingly active and visible role in international science 
diplomacy” (Moedas, 2016). In doing so, the EU is part of, and perhaps leading among, those global 
actors that have jumped on the “science diplomacy” bandwagon, where the activities concerned with 
scientific cooperation (such as part of the work by UNESCO or The World Academy of Sciences – 
TWAS) are framed as “science diplomacy”. 
 
But while the EU, for reasons that are both interest and norm-driven (López de San Román and Schunz, 
2017; Geeraert and Drieskens, 2016), is promoting its ambitions in the field of “science diplomacy”, 
the Commission admits to lack an implementation agenda. It is also openly interested in documenting 
and evaluating its “science diplomacy policy” with the view of improving it (see a call INT-11-2015). 
That is, the EU is keen on understanding how successful have its activities been in building desired 
relationships and what these activities are. However, across the policy discourses and academic 
literature dealing with the policy nexus of foreign and science policy (Flink and Schreiterer, 2010; 
López de San Román and Schunz, 2017; Ruffini, 2017; Van Langenhove, 2017), there is a disconnect 
between the quest to reflect on the actions invoking “science diplomacy” on the one hand, and a 
critical questioning of the concept itself on the other. To date, the continuous reference to the term 
has outpaced the demonstration of its value-added. 
 
The puzzle was sketched by Flink and Schreiterer (2010) who have looked into the practices and 
approaches followed by states in their international use of science and considered them all “science 
diplomacy” only to conclude that the character of “science diplomacy” is fuzzy. There remains a 
considerable scope for understanding the relevance of the discursive innovation of “science 
diplomacy”. Is the concept identifying a novel practice and if so, what is it? If not, what is the reason 
for this new rhetoric? Fundamentally, what policy implications for the EU does this rhetoric generate? 
Questions of this kind arise despite or precisely because of the popularity of the concept of “science 
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diplomacy”. Not only has this survived, but reinforced the assumption that the term is precise, and as 
such reflective of existent policies and capable of shaping future ones. 
 
Yet, this assumption is largely untrue. The improvement of the EU – or indeed anyone else’s – exercise 
of its external policy in science, from the design of the tools to their implementation, can only come 
about through a more exact debate. This article probes into the rhetoric of “science diplomacy” by 
first, critically engaging with its definition, and second, by tracing the official EU policy related to 
science and foreign policy (mostly missing the reference to “science diplomacy”) in the Euro-
Mediterranean (EU’s Southern neighbourhood) region.1 In this latter part, the analysis asks what place 
have policy domains of science, technology, research and innovation had in the EU’s relations in its 
neighbouring region, how have they shaped or been shaped by the EU’s foreign policy and whether 
the ideas introduced by “science diplomacy” have brought or promise to bring any novel approaches 
or progress to the agenda. 
 
Within the EU, the policy field that has been renamed a few times – from science and technology 
(S&D) to research and development (R&D) until in roughly 2010 science has become inseparable also 
from innovation (Science and Public Policy, 2002; Borrás, 2002). The choice of the Euro-Mediterranean 
region is very pertinent because this is a region with a turbulent history of relationships with the EU 
and now being particularly targeted by the recent EU “science diplomacy” endeavours (EC, 2017). 
Since its institutionalisation in 1995, the ambition of creating “an area of peace, prosperity, and 
stability in the Euro-Mediterranean region” (Barcelona declaration, 1995) has continually been 
challenged and attempted at by also scientific cooperation. 
 
In the review, I refer to the policy documents determining the EU’s policy towards the region and look 
for the ultimate aspirations of the EU and the role of science in accomplishing those objectives. 
Noting that the EU’s cooperation between science and foreign policy has been far from systematic 
(Stein, 2002), I seek to identify tendencies to mention science in the EU’s foreign policy documents as 
well as to note references to an international dimension in the EU’s science policy. The overview is 
structured around individual phases of the Euro-Mediterranean relationship, as shaped by the EU’s 
policies and seen from the EU’s point of view. It is worth point out that the literature on the EU’s 
neighbourhood policy (Bicchi and Lavenex, 2015; Bicchi and Gillespie, 2011; Gillespie and Volpi, 2017) 
has paid only marginal attention to the impact on/of scientific relations in the political relations. 
 
Conceptual vagueness of “science diplomacy” 
 
The popularity of “science diplomacy” has been on the steep rise since the frames of the debate were 
set by the UK Royal Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science (RS/AAAS) 
with their 2010 report New frontiers in science diplomacy – navigating the changing balance of powers. 
In it, three dimensions of “science diplomacy” are presented. “Science in diplomacy” is a label for the 
use of scientific evidence in formulating foreign policy; “diplomacy for science” describes the 
deployment of diplomatic channels to enhance research capacities and quality in at least one of the 
countries involved, and “science for diplomacy” relates to the use of science and cooperation between 
scientists (including from countries with strained political relationships) to promote international 
understanding, peace and prosperity (RS/AAS, 2010). 
 
                                                            
 
1 The region is composed of states surrounding the Mediterranean Sea. The coverage of Turkey is not as detailed in this paper 
as it would deserve to be. Turkey is part of the EU’s foreign policy for the Mediterranean, but it has also pursued a bilateral 
relationship with the EU. Its Accession negotiations started in 2005 and are currently stalled, subject to the EU’s condition that 
Turkey applies the Additional Protocol of the Ankara Association Agreement to Cyprus. In the context of this overview, it is 
interesting that the only chapter that has been closed is the one on Science and Research. 
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In itself, the typology is imperfect. One shortcoming is the concept’s premise that international 
scientific relations are conducive to win-win situations. In fact, these relations are both cooperative 
and, increasingly, also competitive (including among the EU countries themselves) (Flink and 
Schreiterer, 2010). They are based both on a positive-sum game diplomacy, where scientific 
cooperation is capable of pursuing a common good, as well as a zero-sum game diplomacy, where 
economic and reputational gains of one actor accomplished through scientific cooperation come on 
the account of another. Having said that, it could essentially make more sense to distinguish between 
an actor’s intention to make the scientific cooperation with partners its foreign policy objective and 
an actor’s intention to use (or exploit) cooperation in science as a tool for another foreign policy goal, 
e.g. dominance. 
 
The second problem with the RS/AAAS model is that frequently, clear-cut cases are not possible. 
Provision of mobility schemes for scientists, for example, require first some diplomatic (or 
bureaucratic) activity to be established (by securing funding and visas), and as a second step allow 
scientists to collaborate productively on their disciplinary domains and in turn nurture intercultural 
understanding. In such instances, “diplomacy for science” quickly turns into “science for diplomacy”. 
Perhaps even “science in diplomacy” could be considered here, if researchers from mobility schemes 
produce policy recommendations that are taken up. Similarly, Science, Technology and Innovation 
(STI) Agreements are both a product of diplomacy and their tool (Dolan, 2012; EC, 2014). Indeed, 
despite the breakdown into the three categories in theory, in practice the differentiation between the 
three rarely occurs and “science diplomacy” functions as a proxy for all. 
 
The third problem with the typology is the lack of nuance for creating a close link between improved 
intercultural understanding among scientists and conflict management or conflict prevention among 
states. While the former can (but not necessarily do) flow from genuine cooperation among people, 
the latter is a much less certain product of that cooperation, especially because scientists as 
individuals may have no direct access to and interest in the political decisions. That some political 
repercussions easily, even automatically, result from scientific cooperation, can be neither demanded 
nor predicted. The collaboration between individuals as a psychological or anthropological matter has 
little to do with relations between states, in times of peace or conflict. The key features of foreign 
policy – hierarchy, history, political borders and tradition are foreign to the world of science (Wagner, 
2002).  
 
The fourth weakness of the typology is that it discounts the role of factors, other than the official 
policy, which also play a role in international cooperation among scientists. The policy of the EU 
particularly supports partnerships. But international linkages in science are not evenly distributed and 
regional relations remain strong, often (but not always) explained by historical relationships, colonial 
ties and geographical proximity (Wagner and Leydesdorff, 2005). Increased international cooperation 
happens in many areas, not only science, and is not always a result of active policy interventions but 
also attitudes and broader globalisation processes. The typology obscures instances when 
international cooperation in science evolves without diplomatic purposes or involvement of classic 
diplomats, perhaps even explicitly away from them. With “science diplomacy”, the notion of 
“diplomacy” – which has always been a distinct ritual, subject to certain specific rules and customs 
– hijacks those apolitical efforts. 
 
Finally, there is the lack of evidence to support individual categories of the typology. Only a handful 
of examples continue being invoked in the discussion. For instance, a synchrotron light SESAME or a 
cooperation between Soviet-US scientists remain popular illustrations of the ability of science and 
research to bring diverse nations together in a sensitive region and used as examples of “science for 
diplomacy”. Instances of “science for diplomacy” that may not have worked as expected are much 
less discussed. Also, how to make sense of the Iranian nuclear deal, that was first hailed as success 
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of “science for diplomacy” (The Atlantic, 2015), but is seriously threatened in 2017 by the US 
president?  
 
Despite the identified shortcomings, the term has been on the rise. The academic literature seems 
complacent with the RS/AAAS categorisation and while engaging with it conceptually to some extent 
(López de San Roman and Schunz, 2017; Ruffini, 2017), its circulation remains secure. As a result, the 
popularity of pointing to interactions between science and foreign policy, even international relations, 
has hardly translated into a more nuanced discourse of the types of such interactions. Instead, 
“science diplomacy” has been understood in broadest terms as any activity at the intersection 
between foreign policy and science, capturing ambitions as diverse as those of increasing visibility of 
science globally, exerting economic influence on other major actors and using scientists to enhance 
peace. It has also caused that a number of critical presumptions tacitly linger in the academic and 
policy literature. Some of these are that “science for diplomacy” can be pre-arranged and scientists 
programmed for political purposes, that intercultural understanding can be engineered by political 
action, that establishing or advancing scientific ties depends on diplomatic efforts and that scientific 
evidence is not an underlying principle of any sound policy process. 
 
These assumptions are impeding a more forward-looking discourse in the context of any actor, 
including the EU. Namely, the discussion of what to do with “science diplomacy” from the point of 
view of the EU will in large part depend upon what “science diplomacy” is understood to be (Flink and 
Schreiterer, 2010). I try to enlighten the debate by a study of evolution of a policy that has turned into 
“science diplomacy”.  
 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
 
Although the early attempts by the European Community to coherently engage with the Mediterranean 
date into 1970s, when Global Mediterranean Policy encompassed a series of bilateral trade and co-
operation agreements with most third Mediterranean countries, it was the 1995 Barcelona Declaration 
and the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) that represents a milestone for 
the EU’s relations with the Southern Mediterranean countries.2 The EMP was a foreign policy initiative 
running in parallel to the process of preparing Central and Eastern European States for accession, 
replacing bilateral relations between the EU Member States and the South Mediterranean countries 
with a multilateral policy and a common approach to the region. The EMP can be praised not only for 
conceiving ‘neighbours’ beyond those linked to the EU by land (Barbe, 1996), but also for its ambition 
of conducting friendly and truly cooperative Euro-Mediterranean relations. The principles of joint 
ownership, dialogue and co-operation stood at the centre of the policy, with the objective of creating 
a Mediterranean region of peace, security and shared prosperity (Barcelona declaration, 1995). 
 
The ambition of the EMP encompassed scientific cooperation. This was enshrined in the EMP both 
as a means for advancing science and socioeconomic development, and as conducive to bringing 
“peoples closer, promoting understanding between them and improving their perception of each 
other” (Barcelona declaration, 1995). Cooperation in science between the EU and the South 
Mediterranean countries was built, “taking account of the principle of mutual advantage”, and 
envisaged instruments, such as “joint research projects”. Although the then valid Framework 
Programme 4 (FP4) was offering a platform for cooperation, the EMP states no obvious preference 
for EU’s instruments and appears to leave the policy open to a joint vision. This is fully in line with the 
principle of “mutual benefit” which was central to the FP4 in relation to third countries and 
international organisations (EC, 2009).  
                                                            
 
2 The intention to establish a new framework for its relations with Mediterranean countries was launched at the European 
Council in Lisbon in June 1992. 
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The EMP’s conception of science both as an end in itself and as a medium to foster people-to-people 
relations is reflective of the optimistic political outlook at the time and was possible because of that 
context. A truly fruitful multilateral scientific cooperation, as could be read into the EMP, was 
dependent on and a product of a considerable political effort. The launch of the EMP coincided with 
the hopes for the Arab-Israeli reconciliation, attempted through the later ill-fated Oslo Peace accords. 
It was just then that the idea of the Arab-Israeli scientific collaboration was born, eventually leading 
to the region’s first synchrotron light source – SESAME (Synchrotron-light for Experimental Science 
and Applications in the Middle East)3, modelled after the European Organization for Nuclear Research 
(CERN) (Sesame, 2018). 
 
The commitment to promote scientific and technological cooperation internationally, both to 
reinforce Community capacities and those of the partners, was scaled up in the subsequent 
Framework Programme (FP5, covering the period between 1998 and 2002) with more instruments, 
funds and vigour. The Mediterranean countries constituted a specific group among the “third 
countries” and science and technology represented the core of the EMP (EC, 2009). The thematic 
priorities for research were selected through a dialogue between all the countries involved and 
encompassed themes, such as socio-economic modernisation, preserving and using cultural heritage 
and regional environmental sustainability. Expected outcomes of cooperation in this period were 
increased training opportunities for researchers, research in support of regional collaboration 
activities as well as tools and decision support systems, all geared towards a progress of a region as 
a whole. 
 
European Neighbourhood Policy 
 
The EMP was supplanted by the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2003.4 At first glance, the 
ENP presented a semantic change in foreign policy approach that came as a response to the EU’s 
future internal changes, determined by its biggest enlargement, to come in 2004.5 The stated ultimate 
objective of the ENP was similar to the one of the EMP: the new policy aspired to create in the 
neighbouring region “a ring of friends” – sharing everything with the Union but institutions (Prodi, 
2002). The ultimate aim was a “zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood” (EC, 2003). With the 
exception of Turkey, which had the prospect of the EU’s membership, the status of the countries in 
the Mediterranean (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Palestine, Syria and 
Tunisia) remained unaffected. 
 
Nevertheless, the ENP represented also a change in style. The approach in accomplishing the same 
policy goals was different from the partnership-centred one, drawing largely from the enlargement 
and association policies (Prodi, 2002). Heavily influenced by the security issues and political events 
in the aftermath of the 9/11 (2001), the ENP was built on the premise that “[t]he EU has a duty, not 
only towards its citizens and those of the new member states, but also towards its present and future 
neighbours, to ensure continuing social cohesion and economic dynamism” (EC, 2003). Contrary to 
the language of cooperation propounded in the Barcelona declaration of 1995, the tone reflects a 
stronger sense of EU’s determination to deliver its pre-set goals. Reflective of this approach are the 
propositions, such as “the EU must act to promote…”, “the EU can and should work to spread the 
                                                            
 
3 SESAME is a partnership between Bahrain, Egypt, Israel, Iran, Jordan, Pakistan, the Palestinian Authority, and Turkey that 
aims to create top research career opportunities in the region and serves as a prime model for interstate scientific 
collaboration. 
4 In parallel with the ENP, the EU conducts bilateral policies with the neighbouring countries. They can be parties to the 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) (some of them to become parties to Association Agreements with the EU) or 
to Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements (EMAA). 
5 The enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania that followed in 2007, was also already forseen. 
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benefits…”, “the EU expects of its partners” etc. Rather than built on a cooperative dialogue, the EU’s 
policy in the Mediterranean became much more prescriptive and more of a one-way process. While 
the principle of common ownership continued to underlie the drafting of the principal instrument in 
the ENP – the so-called “action plans” – there was effectively limited space for their bilateral 
negotiation. Both the objectives and means of cooperation needed to originate from within the 
framework of the EU’s offer. In addition, the EU introduced a much contested “conditionality” (or “more 
for more” approach), on which better compliance was rewarded with more funds (Kelley, 2006). 
 
Scientific cooperation within the ENP played a role of a tool in achieving regional and sub-regional 
cooperation, whose final purpose was to contribute to stability, security and sustainable development 
(EC, 2003), with the first two objectives increasingly taking the lead (EEAS, 2003). The primary tool for 
implementing the cooperation with neighbouring countries in the field of science and technology was 
the opening of the European Research Area (ERA), which was being built as a vision for the future of 
research in Europe. ERA was also at the focus of the 6th Framework Programme for Research and 
Technological Development (RTD), covering the period 2002 to 2006, in which the Mediterranean 
states continued to be eligible for funding. This was an extension, rather than an introduction of their 
cooperation in the ERA. At the general level, support was to be concentrated on the structural and 
institutional capacity-building activities. The implementation of the EU’s ambition in scientific 
cooperation revealed its clear preference to deploy its own structures in that policy field and thereby 
to retain full control over that cooperation. 
 
The ENP expressed a commitment to a common political language of “shared values”, namely 
“democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law” (EEAS, 2003, 4). But the EU presupposed 
that the shared values underlie all of the actions and goals in the ENP, rather than sought them 
through policies. Only gradually, the EU came to recognise that the achievement of ultimate objectives 
– political association, deeper economic integration, access to the EU internal market, increased 
mobility and more people-to-people contacts – depended precisely “on the extent to which common 
European values [were] effectively shared by the neighbouring countries” (Petrov, 2015: 291). The 
potential role of scientists for advancing those shared values was however long unnoticed; it was not 
even when the EU resorted to a more cooperative tone in the implementation of the ENP in 2004 (EC, 
2004) that the EU recognised the potential of scientists in building trust. Furthermore, when the EU 
sought alternative ways to conditionality in order to advance fundamental reforms in countries that 
lacked political will, it relied on civil, economic and social actors as the more obvious partners (EC, 
2015), but interestingly, not the scientists. 
 
During the process of bilateral negotiations between the EU and the Mediterranean countries during 
2003-2005, research and development (or science and technology) were regularly flagged a priority of 
the neighbouring countries. The Commission committed to developing an “ambitious” cooperation in 
this field with the ultimate goal being “sustainable and equitable economic development” 
(Commission, 2005). To achieve it, the priorities for the Commission were the integration of the partner 
countries’ research entities in the ERA, education reform, university exchanges and scholarships 
(ibid.). Among those harmonising actions, the Commission had a curious diplomatic plan for 
“integrat[ing] former weapons of mass destruction scientists into the international science 
communities and support[ing] the civilian application of their sensitive knowledge” (ibid.). These can 
be seen as the first shapes of the Commission’s active attempt to situate the scientific cooperation 
within its high politics and the security issue. 
 
As the ENP progressed, the Commission expressed the desire for the policy to move beyond being a 
matter for officials and politicians and to have also a “human face”. The idea was that the ENP should 
offer opportunities for citizens of the EU and of the neighbouring countries “to interact, and to learn 
more about each other’s societies and understand better each other’s cultures” (EC, 2006: 6-8). In the 
context of this more “popular” foreign policy, the main focus of the Commission in implementing the 
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ENP in science, research and innovation was in mobility of researchers and academics (EC, 2010a). 
However, it is striking to note that the EU was focused only on ways of making “it easier, cheaper and 
faster for our neighbours to enter the EU” and on promoting those tools that attract the partners to 
the EU, rather than interested in pursuing any more balanced exchange to occur more equally in both 
ways (ibid.). The potential of mobility was conceived exclusively in terms of mobility into the EU, 
without this being problematised or even recognised. 
 
In line with the trend of ever increasing cooperation, the 7th Framework Programme covering the 
period 2007-2013 (adopted in 2005) contained the goal of increasing the number of agreements in the 
fields of science and technology between the EU and neighbouring countries. It also sought to ensure 
a more comprehensive support of “scientific diasporas” of European researchers abroad and foreign 
researchers within Europe. Overall, some years into the ENP and at the outset of the FP7, international 
research programmes gradually gained new roles. These existed to expand the interaction of the EU 
with the researchers from the third countries (both through a further general opening up to 
international cooperation and through dedicated actions), based on the belief that there is mutual 
benefit in addressing specific global or regional issues. But besides that, international research 
programmes were increasingly serving also the European research excellence and competitiveness, 
and bolstering the image of the EU as a global actor. The Lisbon Treaty (signed in 2007) 
constitutionally enshrined this ambition (TEU Arts 3.3 and 3.5) and defined the tools to attain it (TFEU 
Title XIX; Arts 179-190).  
 
The Arab Spring 
 
In 2008/2009 the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM), an intergovernmental organisation composed of 
the 28 European Union Member States and 15 countries from the Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean, was established, with the aim to reinforce the Euro-Mediterranean multilateralism. 
However, much more than the set-up of the UfM, it was the events of the Arab Spring in 2011 to 
constitute the next milestone in the implementation of the ENP. The Arab Spring was interpreted by 
the EU as an opportunity and a message “for a qualitative step forward in the relations between the 
EU and its Southern neighbours […] rooted unambiguously in a joint commitment to common values” 
(EC, 2011a). Although the EU committed to “faster and more ambitious political and economic 
reforms” through the launch of the “Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity” (ibid.), neither 
the pace nor the change has become substantively different. 
 
The most significant impact of the renewed approach was that the EU policy effectively became 
divided between one led in relation to the governments and another one in relation to the civil society 
(EC, 2011b). The EU’s determination was to “curtai[l] relations with governments engaged in violations 
of human rights and democracy standards, including by […] strengthen[ing] further its support to civil 
society” (EC, 2011b). Interestingly, the scientists were not considered to form part of the civil society 
– a parallel sphere that is institutionalised but not authoritative and an alternative to civil society. 
Also fostering science itself was clearly not the top priority of the EU in the region, unlike democracy, 
growth, job creation, microfinance and higher education (EU, 2011).  
 
The emergence and implementation of “science diplomacy” 
 
From this position of science as “low politics”, a milestone in the process of mainstreaming 
international scientific cooperation was the launch of the Europe 2020 strategy (EC, 2010b). The 
strategy entails a comprehensive package of the EU’s policies, buttressed by research and innovation. 
These were continually highlighted by the Commission as a source of renewed growth out of the 
economic crisis (Ulnicane, 2016). With science having moved to the heart of the EU’s mission, the 
Commission launched the strategy to “use international cooperation in research and innovation as an 
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instrument of soft power and a mechanism for improving relations with key countries and regions” 
and labelled it “science diplomacy” (EC, 2012). The EU’s proposal to the neighbouring countries 
concerned the development of a “Common Knowledge and Innovation Space” in order to improve the 
research and innovation competences of these countries. Mobility and people-to-people contact 
continued to play a fundamental role. 
 
Of the Commission’s expectation about “science diplomacy” (ibid.), the part that good relations 
between countries facilitate effective cooperation in research seems to be much easier to validate 
than the proposition that international cooperation in research and innovation have improved 
relations with key countries and regions. The analysis so far confirms that cooperation in science and 
research between the EU and the Mediterranean countries appears to be highly susceptible to the 
political relations. But scientific cooperation was contingent on politics, rather than impacting it. 
When political climate in the region was good or relations with certain countries stable, scientific 
cooperation was also thriving and retained a more genuine nature, as for instance with Tunis. On the 
other hand, in case of an intricate political situation in a country, such as with Libya after 2011, 
scientific community is short of the same level of cooperation and also the ambition that they could 
be part of a resolution. 
 
The latest framework programme, Horizon2020 (covering the period of 2014-2020), is heavily geared 
towards cooperation with third countries and international organisations. More than any previous 
framework programmes, it demonstrates an ever-closer interplay between individual policies. A 
number of expectations about international cooperation in science are enshrined in Horizon 2020: 
that it contributes to achieving the Europe 2020 strategy (strengthening the EU’s excellence), that it 
will resolve global societal challenges and explicitly, also that it will support the EU’s external and 
development policy objectives (EU, 2013). The latter is a striking proposition limiting the 
independence of scientific enterprise. 
 
Among the key activities to foster international cooperation is a full integration of four countries from 
the Mediterranean into Horizon2020 under the same conditions as EU Member States, namely Turkey, 
Israel, Algeria and Tunisia. Another key action is the launch of the Partnership for Research and 
Innovation in the Mediterranean Area (PRIMA). This is a €400 million partnership between some EU 
and certain non-EU Mediterranean countries,6 aiming at supporting research and innovation actions 
that will result in sustainable water management and food production. PRIMA is devoted to the 
principles of mutual benefit, equal-footing partnerships, co-ownership, co-decision, and co-financing, 
as well as excellence and added value (EC, 2018/online). It is a role model of co-financing, as it is 
financed in just under 50% from the EU’s Horizon 2020 funds, while the rest comes from all other 
participating countries. These themes for cooperation had been selected jointly as being of common 
interest and mutual benefit. The participating states recognised the initiative’s significant potential 
for enhancing the stability of the region and its sustainable economic and social development (CEU, 
2014). 
 
A new stage in scientific cooperation? 
 
These most recent EU’s endeavours are characterised by the following features. The EU has 
articulated a new era of “science diplomacy” shortly preceding the mandate of Commissioner Moedas 
and heavily promoted it during his mandate (Moedas, 2015; Moedas, 2016; ERC, 2016; EC, 2017; see 
also the Hearing of Carlos Moedas, Commissioner-Designate). In the same period, none of the 
previously used major approaches, such as mobility and cooperation on joint research projects have 
been replaced, and no new substantively new approaches introduced.  
                                                            
 
6 There were initially 14 countries participating, but the number has since grown to 19. 
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The most recent EU diction (EC, 2015; EU, 2013a) seems to be pulling into contrasting directions. On 
the one hand, the EU takes differentiation and mutual ownership much more seriously by advocating 
the development of a Common Knowledge and Innovation Space between the EU and its neighbours, 
as well as joint research and innovation priorities through joint programmes, such as PRIMA. On the 
other hand, the EU does not shy away from promoting to its neighbours its own concepts (such as 
‘smart specialisation’)7, initiatives (such as the Enterprise Europe Network) and tools (such as Horizon 
2020). While mutual interest is pursued and sustainable development represents the overarching goal, 
this is matched, if not overridden, by the “critical need to reinforce, widen and extend the excellence 
of the Union's science base and […] to secure Europe's long term competitiveness and well-being” 
(CEU, 2013). There is a clear expectation that “activities at international level enhance the 
competitiveness of European industry by promoting the take-up and trade of novel technologies, for 
instance through the development of worldwide standards and interoperability guidelines, and by 
promoting the acceptance and deployment of European solutions outside Europe” (EU, 2013b). Thus, 
the EU has recently taken a most assertive approach to international scientific cooperation that 
admits a competitive nature. It has also added the expectation that its research policy supports its 
external and development policy. The documents are drafted to ensure not only that the language of 
science is universally adopted and that strong and comprehensive international scientific knowledge 
is supported, but also that the EU is positioned in such a way that it would be able to influence the 
direction of global policy. 
 
Without a clear indication as to the way in which the new goals will be attained, “science diplomacy” 
will be limited to a rhetorical innovation capturing unavoidable processes. An ever-closer connection 
between science, an essentially internal policy of the EU, and foreign policy, are an empirical fact. This 
is because to some extent, international activities have always been the outcome of pursuing 
excellent science (Wagner, 2002), and the globalisation processes have further encouraged them. On 
the level of individuals, people’s attitudes are more open to international cooperation (Bucham, 2009). 
On the systemic level, the EU has been gradually expanding the EU’s external competence and activity 
(Bretherton and Vogler, 2004) and thus integrating also research objectives into EU external relations. 
The EU’s efforts to flesh out a coherent foreign policy (CEU, 2001; EC, 2006; EEAS, 2016) has 
culminated in the Lisbon Treaty, which states that a multitude of the EU’s values, objectives and 
interests should be consistently implemented (Arts 3 and 13, TEU) and that research and 
technological development should contribute towards the economic goals of a more competitive 
industry (179 TFEU). These instructions are consistent with the EU’s growing ambition of becoming 
a global actor (Jupille and Caporaso, 1998; Ginsberg, 1999; Bretherton and Vogler, 2006; Koehler, 
2010). 
 
There is also a political motivation for ensuring that science has a place in external relations. In the 
context of the EU, the interests in the field of science and research were constitutive to the integration 
project and were driving the interaction between the European and national dimensions (Guzzetti, 
1995). Science has been promoted as a driver of the EU’s progress over the past two decades. The 
concepts of “knowledge society” (introduced by the 2000 Lisbon Strategy) and “Innovation Union” 
(associated with the launch of Europe 2020 Strategy in 2010) position the policy field of science to the 
heart of today’s EU integration project and its ambitions. The rising prominence of science is also part 
of the latest (Junker’s) Commission’s effort to create a more political role for itself. In this context, 
                                                            
 
7 The EU’s concept ‘smart specialisation’ was developed in the EU’s regional policy as a tool for designing innovation and 
investment strategies of regions, relying on an entrepreneurial and bottom-up collaboration between various sectors where 
they have competitive advantages. European Commission (EC) Regional Policy contributing to smart growth in Europe 2020, 
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
Committee and the Committee of the Regions, 6.10.2010, COM (2010) 553 final. 
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mainstreaming science into “high politics” certainly goes a long way towards empowering the 
Commission vis-à-vis member states and the EU vis-à-vis other global players. 
 
Yet, it should be clear that despite the close interplay between the EU’s foreign policy and science (or 
research) policy, the message about their significance is mostly propounded by the Commissioner of 
research, science and innovation. He may insist that "cooperation in research and innovation with our 
Middle East partners is a priority for the EU” (Moedas, 2015). However, his efforts hit the reality in a 
broader political context: the role of science in foreign policy continues to rank low. Both the 2015 
ENP Review (EC, 2015) and the launch of the most recent foreign policy strategy in 2016 (EEAS, 2016), 
which interestingly does not use the term “science diplomacy”, reveal a supporting role for science as 
a platform for engagement, rather than a transformative factor in the accomplishment of the major 
goals. The renewed ENP may see research, science and innovation as crucial in the creation of decent 
and sustainable jobs. But stabilisation remains “the most urgent challenge” and the “main political 
priority” of the new ENP (EC, 2015). Among the factors affecting stabilisation in the EU’s belief are 
poverty, inequality, a perceived sense of injustice, corruption, weak economic and social development 
and lack of opportunity (EC, 2015). Science may contribute towards resolving those concerns, but in 
a rather marginal way. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Across the board, “science diplomacy” has so far been used as an umbrella term to describe highly 
dissimilar efforts. Normatively, it also represents a categorical label for justifying and enhancing 
science in policy, including in external policy. The emptiness of the term “science diplomacy” has 
gone unnoticed because in principle science is good for everyone, so nobody opposes its promotion. 
 
Yet, this buzzword has hardly any value. This paper has demonstrated that the EU’s conception of its 
own “science diplomacy” encompasses many of the goals that have already been pursued in the 
history of the Euro-Mediterranean relationships since the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean 
Partnership, but also a more politically ambitious approach and more assertive attitude to attain its 
competitive advantage not as strongly expressed so far. In contrast to widening the objectives, the 
EU has not substantively broadened the tools it avails of, implying that its actual policy in regional 
scientific cooperation might nevertheless stay the same. To make sense of the new rhetoric, the paper 
has finally highlighted the political drive for endorsing “science diplomacy”.  
 
Understanding the circumstances might go some way to alleviate the pressure of implementing all 
the objectives stuffed within a single policy. However, there is hardly any good reason to continue 
defending an uncritical use of “science diplomacy” in both policy and academic discourse. To be able 
to reflect on the performance by the EU at all and meaningfully orient it, more precision is needed on 
what we are describing or targeting. At best, the promotion of “science diplomacy” risks not delivering 
the promise on the resources being spent. At worst, inducing political expectations in the work of 
scientists may burden the scientists’ primary responsibilities with the pressure of the need for that 
genuine cooperation to result in higher, more strategic outcomes. This is very likely to, and indeed 
has, invoked a backlash (Moro-Martín, 2017). 
 
An immediate recommendation for policy-makers would be to acknowledge that “science diplomacy” 
can be a harmful mantra. Avoiding the euphemism of “diplomacy” when “cooperation” could often be 
more appropriate both as a means and the goal, could be an appropriate first step. Once we break the 
myth of “science diplomacy”, we would be better to ask how, realistically, to continue benefitting from 
science. Are cases where scientific cooperation does not ease the political tensions really less 
successful? What if scientific cooperation, in which the EU is involved, positively impacts people’s 
everyday lives in the neighbouring counties without resolving the political tensions? What if the EU’s 
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emphasis of the significance of science per se impacts on the perceptions of the political actors and 
civil society in the region, who influence the policies? (Pace, Seeberg and Cavatorta, 2009) 
 
Mutually beneficial forms of technical cooperation might bring exactly those practical impacts for 
citizens that justify the advancement of science, for instance in water management or food 
production, as tackled by the PRIMA initiative. In fact, this would seem to align with the decision of 
the EU to pursue in the neighbouring region, now indeed, more real co-ownership and genuine 
cooperation, rather than assistance, control and prescriptiveness that have marked periods of the 
past engagement (EC, 2015). Following this guidance, the new generation of cooperation in the field 
of research and technology would need to refrain from the majority EU funding, determination of 
objectives and beliefs that high politics emerges from it. Scientific cooperation offers a unique avenue 
for exercising principles that foreign policy is formally endorsing but often forgetting in practice.
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